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in	the	chair),	J.	R.	Jellicoe	(Director	of	Naval	Ordnance),	R.	H.	S.	Bacon,	C.	Madden,	S.	Nicholson,	H.	Jones,	H.	
Orpen,	T.	E.	Crease	and	Graham	Greene.	In	Naval	Necessities	IV,	held	by	ALHRB,	Portsmouth.	
42
	The	Fusion	Committee’s	report	is	held	as	‘II-	Fusion	Design	of	Armoured	Design’	(sic),	in	report	of	Navy	
Estimates	Committee,	1906-7,	AL	253/28,	Admiralty	Library	Naval	Historical	Branch,	Portsmouth	[ALHRB].	
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Fleet	before	moving	in	the	direction	of	greatly	increased	speed,	and	that	the	proposed	“Fusion”	
ships	are,	for	the	moment,	premature’.
43
	
				A	momentous	decision	was	thus	taken	not	to	construct	such	vessels	until	a	sufficient	quantity	of	
less	capable	capital	ships	had	been	created	to	make	the	fusion	vessels’	appearance	decisive.	This	
resolution	was	accepted	by	the	Admiralty,	though	it	ran	counter	to	the	expectations	of	Fisher	when	
as	First	Sea	Lord	when	he	established	the	Fusion	Committee.
44
	Indeed,	the	decision	was	a	clear	
check	to	Fisher’s	programme	of	constant,	‘plunging’	innovation,	and	constituted	an	exemplary	case	
of	professional	policy	formulation	and	decision-making	by	a	learning	organisation.
45
	The	decision	to	
postpone	the	‘fusion’	ships	was	prescient	in	both	technical	and	strategic	terms.	In	1906,	the	pace	of	
development	was	such	that	the	Committee’s	idea	of	a	fusion	ship,	involving	wing	turrets	and	the	
new	13.5”gun,	would	resemble	the	first	super-dreadnoughts	of	the	Orion	class,	and	though	capable	
these	vessels	would	have	been	dated	by	1914.	Waiting	for	them	would	have	served	little	technical	
purpose	and	resulted	in	a	more	expensive	and	thus	smaller	fleet	when	war	broke	out.	It	could	even	
																																								 																				
43
	Fusion	Committee	report.	
44
	At	the	meeting	of	the	Sea	Lords	which	instigated	the	Fusion	Committee,	it	was	stated	that	‘It	was	desired	to	
bring	about	a	fusion	of	the	two	designs’	(i.e.	battleships	and	battlecruisers)	‘by	next	year;	it	seemed	possible	
for	this	to	be	done,	and	it	would	be	a	great	assistance	if	the	committee	would	look	into	this	matter.’	In	Naval	
Necessities	IV.	
45
	In	this	we	disagree	with	Angus	K.	Ross,	Four	lessons	that	the	US	Navy	must	learn	from	the	'Dreadnought'	
revolution,	Naval	College	War	Review	63	no.4	(2010),	pp.	119-143,	which	argues	that	Fisher	wanted	an	
innovative	revolution	and	the	Fusion	Committee	thwarted	this.	Ross	considers	this	outcome	to	be	failure,	and	
the	lesson	(for	the	21
st
	century	US	Navy)	the	importance	of	being	a	'learning	organization'.	We	instead	claim	
that	the	Fusion	Committee's	position	was	a	conscious,	technocratic	decision	which	guaranteed	British	naval	
supremacy	through	big-gun	firepower.	The	Royal	Navy’s	qualities	as	a	learning	organization	are	demonstrated	
throughout	the	archive	material	of	the	period.	For	example,	in	‘The	Building	Programme	of	the	British	Navy:	
The	lessons	of	the	Russo-Japanese	war	in	their	application	to	the	programme	of	armoured-ship	building	of	
Britain,	Germany,	and	France’	(AL	252/3/8,	15
th
	February	1906,	ALHRB)	we	find	a	balanced	and	thorough	
analysis	of	French,	Italian	and	US	commentary	on	Tsushima	(the	writer	is	clearly	an	attentive	reader	of	PUSNI).	
Similarly	‘Admiralty	Policy:	Replies	to	criticism’	(AL	252/5/8,	15
th
	October	1906,	ALHRB)	is	a	thorough	and	
balanced	140-page	response	to	criticism	of	the	Dreadnought	concept.		
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have	created	for	the	Germans	a	window	of	opportunity	during	the	first	few	months	of	the	war	
during	which	they	might	have	achieved	parity	or	even	a	small	advantage	in	big-gun	fire.
46
		
				The	design	of	the	actual	fusion	ships,	the	Queen	Elizabeth	Class,	was	not	finalised	until	1912.	Their	
new	configuration,	with	eight	new	15’’	guns	of	unprecedented	power	in	four	turrets,	rather	than	ten	
13.5’’	weapons	in	five,	provided	greater	firepower	and	a	saving	in	weight	which	was	translated	into	
both	heavier	armour	and	nearly	twice	the	propulsive	power	of	the	previous	class	of	super-
dreadnoughts.	They	also	promised	to	make	redundant	the	concept	of	constructing	separate	
battleships	and	battlecruisers,	as	the	new	vessels	were	expected	to	perform	both	roles	capably.	Even	
at	this	stage,	however,	technical	capability	fell	slightly	short	of	the	true	fast	battleship,	and	the	
battlecruiser	survived.		The	top	speed	of	the	Queen	Elizabeth	class	fell	between	the	maxima	of	
typical	battleships	and	battlecruisers,	and	the	apparent	success	of	battlecruisers	in	the	early	clashes	
at	the	Falkland	Islands	and	Heligoland	Bight	coupled	with	the	return	of	Fisher	as	First	Sea	Lord	
shortly	after	the	outbreak	of	war	led	to	the	commissioning	of	two	new	vessels	of	the	type,	Renown	
and	Repulse.	Indeed	Repulse	replaced	a	battleship	of	the	same	name	of	the	Royal	Sovereign	class	
already	in	the	early	stages	of	construction,	the	contract	for	which	was	cancelled.
47
	The	Royal	
Sovereign	class	vessels	themselves,	though	succeeding	the	Queen	Elizabeths,	also	reverted	to	the	
lower	speed	of	existing	battleships.		
				Despite	wartime	reversion	to	the	battlecruiser	concept,	the	new	Queen	Elizabeths	as	fusion	ships	
were	a	genuine	advance	on	the	original	Dreadnought	design	and,	like	Dreadnought,	outclassed	all	
																																								 																				
46
	A	fascinating	episode	in	the	development	of	these	ideas	is	the	Sims	vs	Mahan	controversy	in	the	USA,	which	
pitched	the	US	Inspector	of	Target	Practice	against	the	great	naval	historian	Mahan	in	the	pages	of	PUSNI.	Sims	
made	telling	arguments	in	favour	of	all-big-gun	ships,	but	the	interest	for	our	purposes	is	in	the	US-UK	
interchange	of	ideas.	Sims’	paper	for	Roosevelt,	‘Big	Battleships	of	High	Speed’,	was	sent	in	confidence	to	
Fisher	on	3
rd
	November	2007	(before	Roosevelt’s	January	1907	speech	to	congress	on	the	topic),	and	forms	the	
basis	of	the	argument	of	the	Director	of	Naval	Intelligence	C.	L.	Ottley’s	‘The	Strategic	Aspects	of	Our	Building	
Programme,	1907’	(AL	253/68,	ALHRB),	sent	to	the	King’s	private	secretary.	Sims	restated	his	argument	in	‘The	
Tactical	Qualities	of	the	Dreadnought	Type	of	Battleship’,	Brassey’s	Naval	Annual	1907,	pp.	391-409.		
47
	I.	Johnston,	Clydebank	Battlecruisers	(Barnsley,	2011),	p.92.	
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previous	vessels	afloat	when	they	entered	service.	The	ten	15”	ships	of	this	and	the	similarly-
configured	but	slower	and	more	heavily	armoured	Royal	Sovereign	class	did	not	join	the	fleet	until	
after	the	outbreak	of	war.	Their	arrival,	however,	added	massively	to	the	gun	power	of	the	existing	
Grand	Fleet,	transformed	what	for	Jellicoe	was	a	worryingly	narrow	margin	of	superiority	into	a	
decisive	advantage,	and	removed	any	prospect	of	a	German	challenge	to	the	full	Grand	Fleet.	Only	
two	comparable	vessels	of	the	German	Bayern	class	were	completed.	
				In	adopting	a	quantitative	approach	to	their	situation,	the	British	had	implicitly	taken	a	view	on	a	
mathematical	issue,	of	what	is	the	unit	of	offensive	and	defensive	force	concentration.	A	simplistic	
view	would	assert	that	this	was	the	capital	ship,	but	in	Lanchestrian	war	destruction	is	wrought	in	
proportion	to	the	number	of	effective	weapons,	big	guns	in	the	context	of	1916.
48
		The	British	had	
thus	determined	to	place	guns	on	the	water	as	quickly	as	possible.	By	the	time	the	last	ship	of	the	
four	Nassau	class	vessels	was	commissioned	in	May	1910,	the	Royal	Navy	had	commissioned	seven	
dreadnought	battleships	and	three	battlecruisers.	The	value	of	this	approach	became	still	more	
apparent	when	the	characteristics	of	the	Nassau	class	became	known.	Despite	their	heavy	armour	
and	high	build	quality	the	German	vessels	were,	as	with	Blücher,	backward	in	important	respects.	
The	Nassaus	had	obsolete	reciprocating	engines	rather	than	the	turbines	of	all	British	dreadnoughts.	
The	vessels	carried	an	imposing	twelve	guns	compared	to	the	standard	British	ten,		but	had	four	
wing	turrets,	two	on	each	side	of	the	vessel,	which	could	not	fire	across	deck.	Thus	only	eight	guns	
could	be	fired	in	broadside	and	a	third	of	the	ships’	firepower	was	wasted.	The	guns	were	of	11”	
calibre,	when	the	British	were	already	moving	to	13.5”	all	along	the	centreline.	
																																								 																				
48
	The	belief	that	the	ship	is	the	unit	can	lead	to	views	such	as	‘sea	battles	based	on	[big	guns]	were	bound	to	
be	indecisive	because	heavy	guns	hardly	ever	sank	ships’	(R.	Garcia	y	Robertson,	‘Failure	of	the	heavy	gun	at	
sea,	1898-1922’,	Technology	and	Culture,	28	(1987),	pp.	539-557).	In	contrast	we	argue	not	only	that	such	
battles	can	be	won,	by	destroying	turrets,	but	that	Lanchestrian	certainty	of	outcome	can	lead	to	strategic	
victory	after	inconclusive	fighting.	
22	
	
				A	ship	with	its	main	armament	unable	to	bear	in	broadside,	or	completely	wrecked	in	battle,	
contributes	nothing	in	the	Lanchester	equations	except	to	the	extent	to	which	it	deflects	fire	away	
from	still-active	ships.	The	unit,	rather,	is	the	set	of	weapons	which	stands	and	falls	together.	Fiske	
reached	the	unambiguous,	definitive	conclusion	that	the	appropriate	unit	was	the	big-gun	turret,	
and	this	view	remains	persuasive.
49
	German	turrets	enjoyed	no	special	advantage	over	British	in	
terms	of	protection	and	were	no	less	likely	to	be	disabled	or	destroyed	in	action.
50
	They	also	
contained	guns	of	lesser	calibre	than	their	British	opponents,	though	this	deficiency	would	tell	only	
at	long	ranges,	given	the	greater	accuracy	of	the	smaller	German	guns	and	the	limited	effectiveness	
of	British	shells	before	1916.	From	this	perspective,	that	of	a	battle	of	gun	turrets,	the	British	
advantage	in	gun	power	fully	justified	pre-war	policy	if	their	weapons	were	employed	to	full	effect.	
However,	if	the	explosions	on	the	British	battlecruisers	represented	a	generic	fault	in	Royal	Navy	
dreadnought	design,	so	that	the	destruction	of	a	turret	entailed	the	destruction	of	the	ship,	then	the	
whole	ship	would	have	to	be	considered	the	relevant	unit	of	mass,	with	radical	effects	on	the	
Lanchestrian	balance	in	Germany’s	favour.
51
		
				A	complicating	factor	in	addressing	this	issue	is	again	the	separate	command	of	the	Grand	Fleet	
under	Jellicoe	and	the	BCF	under	Beatty.	The	latter’s	aggressive	style	of	command	has	been	
identified	by	some	as	having	an	effect	on	the	vulnerability	of	his	vessels,	both	in	the	manner	of	their	
deployment	and	in	their	gunnery	training	and	the	procedures	they	employed	in	action.	Jellicoe,	by	
contrast,	has	been	characterised	by	his	critics	as	a	cautious	technocrat,	lacking	the	fighting	spirit	
																																								 																				
49
	‘each	[big-gun]	turret	with	its	guns	should	be	regarded	as	a	unit.	There	seems	to	be	no	escape	whatever	
from	the	conclusion	that	we	should	recognize	the	combination	as	our	unit	of	offensive	and	defensive	power...'	
(Fiske’s	italics),	Fiske,	‘American	Naval	Policy’,	p.	28.		
50
	J.	Campbell,	Jutland:	an	analysis	of	the	fighting		(London,	1986).	
51
	For	a	recent	treatment	see	N.	A.	Lambert,	‘‘Our	Bloody	Ships'	or	‘Our	Bloody	System'?	Jutland	and	the	loss	of	
the	battle	cruisers,	1916’,	Journal	of	Military	History,		62	(1998),	pp.	29-55.	
23	
	
necessary	in	a	fleet	commander.	The	Admiralty’s	assiduous	pre-war	planning	to	provide	a	fleet	
suitable	for	war	was	thus	at	the	mercy	of	those	employed	to	use	it.
52
	
	
III	
Having	built	a	fleet	calculated	to	guarantee	strategic	victory	under	Lanchestrian	conditions,	it	then	
became	essential	to	a	successful	outcome	that	this	fleet	be	commanded	so	as	to	bring	such	
conditions	about.	The	contrast	between	Jellicoe,	commander	in	1916	of	the	Grand	Fleet,	and	Beatty,	
commander	of	the	BCF,	was	in	many	ways	representative	of	their	intellectual	environment.	The	
impact	of	new	technology	and	new	thinking	created	a	fast	moving	debate	in	which	a	considerable	
degree	of	erudition	was	required	to	keep	up.
53
	Jellicoe	was	just	such	a	technocrat,	and	made	it	his	
business	to	keep	abreast	of	developments	and	explore	their	implications.	Beatty	represented	the	
opposite	end	of	the	spectrum.	Self-consciously	Nelsonian,	he	interpreted	this	tradition	in	terms	of	
aggressive,	thrusting	leadership	and	an	overriding	requirement	to	close	with	the	enemy	and	impose	
his	will.	Beatty	did	not	consider	his	style	of	leadership	to	be	unintelligent	or	ignorant,	and	his	
reflective	professionalism	has	been	noted.
54
	He	was,	however,	overtly	anti-intellectual	and	was	not	
alone	in	so	being.	HMS	Dreadnought	attracted	the	hostility	of	this	faction,	which	did	not	accept	the	
																																								 																				
52
	A	wide-ranging	recent	source	is	James	A.	Yates,	The	Jutland	Controversy:	A	case	study	in	intra-service	politics,	
with	particular	reference	to	the	presentation	of	the	Battlecruiser	Fleet's	training,	conduct	and	command,	PhD	
thesis,	University	of	Hull,	1998.	
53
	In	the	Royal	Navy,	a	central	figure	in	the	Dreadnought-era	investigation	of	ship	(as	opposed	to	fleet)	tactics	is	
Admiral	Sir	William	May,	commander	of	the	Home	Fleet	1909-11	and	(while	C-in-C	at	Plymouth)	umpire	of	its	
exercises	in	1912-13.	Papers	in	MAY/10,	Caird	Library,	Greenwich,	show	detailed	understanding	of	how	big	
guns	and	increasing	ranges	emphasize	the	importance	of	plotting,	spotting	and	rate	change.	This	can	be	
contrasted	with	the	writings	of	old-schoolers	such	as	Adm	Sir	Cyprian	Bridge,	The	Art	of	Naval	Warfare:	
introductory	observations	(London,	1907),	or	Adm	Sir	R.	N.	Custance	(writing	anonymously	as	‘Barfleur'),	Naval	
Policy:	a	plea	for	the	study	of	war	(London,	1907),	who	stresses	the	need	for	concentration,	but	fails	to	
understand	that	the	long	range	of	big	guns	changes	the	way	this	is	best	achieved.	
54
	Lambert,	Admirals,	p.346.	
24	
	
sudden	strategic	and	tactical	shifts	it	necessitated.	Jellicoe	thus	represented	a	new	and	untested	
rationality,	and	in	his	command	role	faced	the	additional	burden	that	his	hard	thinking	about	the	
fleet	action	of	the	future	would	be	contested	and	in	some	powerful	quarters	disregarded.	
				Jellicoe’s	writings	before	Jutland	make	clear	his	careful	consideration	of	the	tactics	necessary	to	
bring	about	Lanchestrian	victory.	His	commitment	to	an	undivided	fleet	has	already	been	noted.	
Despite	his	well-known	apprehensions	concerning	the	danger	posed	by	torpedoes,	he	intended	to	
open	fire	at	medium	to	long	ranges	and	continue	doing	so	for	several	minutes	even	after	he	knew	
that	torpedoes	had	been	launched	against	him,	taking	advantage	of	their	slow	running	to	create	the	
crucial	few	minutes	of	unopposed	fire	before	evasive	action	became	necessary.
55
	He	also	
appreciated	that	long	ranges	and	high	speeds	made	full	control	of	his	fleet	essential,	both	to	
engineer	Lanchestrian	conditions	of	force	concentration,	and	to	extricate	the	fleet	intact	from	an	
																																								 																				
55
	Sumida,	in	‘A	Matter	of	Timing’	and	‘Expectation’,	believes	that	Jellicoe	sought	a	medium-range	battle,	while	
Seligmann,	‘A	German	preference?’,	contends	that	Jellicoe	was	well	aware	of	the	German	excellence	at	long-
range	shooting	and	sought	to	match	it.	Of	course	improvement	in	gunnery	was	rapid,	and	Jellicoe	would	have	
well	understood	that	neither	side	could	expect	to	have	perfect	knowledge	of	the	other’s	state	of	development.	
His	views	therefore	had	to	be	fluid.	He	clearly	understood	the	importance	of	opening	fire	at	the	longest	
possible	ranges	as	early	as	1906:	‘The	function	of	artillery	is	not	only	to	destroy	the	enemy	...	but	also	to	
prevent	the	development	of	his	power	by	doing	so	at	ranges	at	which	he	is	unable	to	make	an	effective	reply	
[Jellicoe's	emphasis].	…	It	is	curious	to	note	that	although	this	fact	has	been	long	recognised	in	shore	fighting	...	
it	has	never	until	recently	been	sufficiently	recognized	in	naval	warfare.	...	The	recent	development	of	the	
prospect	of	hitting	frequently	at	long	ranges	is	the	all-important	fact...'	(Jellicoe,	‘Considerations	of	the	Design	
of	a	Battleship’,	AL	252/4/8,	ALHRB).	During	the	war	we	may	note	the	subtle	shift		between	August	1914,	when	
he	wrote	that	‘deployment	at	long	range	may	give	us	the	initial	advantage	in	gunfire	it	is	so	important	to	
obtain,	but	there	can	be	no	doubt	that	we	must	gradually	close	the	range	to	obtain	decisive	results’	
(Addendum	to	Grand	Fleet	Battle	Instructions,	Jellicoe	Papers,	vol.1	,	item	38),	and	May	1916,	which	has	‘I	
attach	the	greatest	importance	to	making	full	use	of	the	fire	of	our	heavier	guns	in	the	early	stages	at	long	
range	…	the	range	should	be	between	15,000	and	10,000	yards,	the	latter	being	reached	as	the	enemy’s	fire	is	
overcome;	in	the	early	stages	of	an	action	I	do	not	desire	to	close	the	range	much	inside	14,000	yards’		(Grand	
Fleet	Battle	Orders,	Jellicoe	Papers,	vol.1,	item	225).	His	governing	principle	–	naturally	enough,	and	perfectly	
that	of	Fiske,	Baudry	and	Lanchester	–	was	that	‘our	system	must	be	that	which	…	will	enable	the	highest	rate	
of	accurate	fire’	(Jellicoe,		18/1/15,	`Remarks	on	the	use	of	director	firing	from	the	main	armament',	held	in	
ADM	137/1995,	National	Archives,	Kew,	and	cited	in	Sumida,	‘Expectation’).	
25	
	
engagement	without	danger	of	defeat	in	detail.
56
		As	noted	earlier,	concentration	of	fire	now	
required	not	massing	of	ships	but	rather	fleet	dispositions	which	guaranteed	concentration	of	
gunfire,	a	very	different	proposition	which	made	a	Nelsonian	emphasis	on	the	granting	of	great	
latitude	to	subordinates,		now	known	as	‘mission	command’,	peculiarly	inappropriate.			
				Indeed,	the	increased	certainty	of	geometric	firepower	concentration	over	melee	tactics	can	be	
quantified.	We	noted	earlier	that	symmetric	random	fragmentation	of	the	opposing	fleets	in	an	
otherwise-deterministic	Lanchestrian	battle	has	the	effect	of	randomizing	the	outcome.	For	
example,	splitting	each	fleet	into	two	(uniformly	distributed)	random	fragments,	while	it	does	not	
change	the	average	outcome,	has	the	effect	of	injecting	randomness	equivalent	to	a	standard	
deviation	(i.e.	typical	variation)	in	the	ratio	of	the	fleets’	numbers	of	16%,	and	thereby	a	typical	
variation	in	square-law	fighting	strengths	of	36%.	Put	simply,	allowing	such	division	creates	a	high	
degree	of	randomness,	which	can	easily	overturn	the	certainty	of	a	Lanchestrian	advantage.	At	their	
simplest,	the	tactical	imperatives	facing	Jellicoe	and	Scheer	are,	as	so	often,	best	captured	by	
Hughes:	‘A	major	part	of	skill	and	expertise	is	recognizing	and	avoiding	situations	dominated	by	
uncertainty	when	superior,	and	creating	opportunities	for	uncertainty	for	the	enemy	when	
inferior.’
57
	For	Jellicoe,	a	melee	would	have	randomised	his	perfect	Lanchestrian	battle.		For	Scheer,	
a	melee	against	part	of	the	Grand	Fleet	might	have	been	ideal.	
				Jellicoe	therefore	faced	a	tension	between	some	degree	of	certainty	about	the	correct	tactics	for	
employing	his	big	guns,	alongside	great	uncertainty	about	both	their	effectiveness	and	the	possible	
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	See	Goldrick,	Before	Jutland.	Historians	who	have	served	as	naval	officers	tend	to	place	greater	emphasis	on	
a	commander’s	remaining	in	full	control	of	his	fleet	than	do	civilian	historians	(Wayne	Hughes,	private	
communication).	
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	Wayne	P.	Hughes,	‘Uncertainty	in	Combat’,	Military	Operations	Research,	1	(1994),	pp.	45-57.		Drax’s	essay	
in	BTY/7/2,	noted	above,	remains	equivocal	on	divisional	tactics.	He	understands	Fiske’s	principle	that	
‘concentration	requires	isolation’	(Fiske,	Fighting	Machine,	p263)	but	fails	to	reach	a	clear	view	on	whether	
such	concentration	requires	departure	from	line-ahead	tactics.	He	wants	divisions	to	be	able	to	exploit	
transient	opportunities	available	to	them,	but	knows	that	dividing	a	fleet	can	lead	to	defeat	in	detail,	a	stark	
conclusion	of	Fiske	and	Lanchester.	
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importance	of	the	mine	and	torpedo.
58
	The	actual	outcome	of	the	battle	would	not	necessarily	be	
the	most	probable	outcome,	and	Jellicoe’s	heavy	burden	of	responsibility	and	reflective	
temperament	dictated	a	cautious	appraisal	of	an	action	long	anticipated.	Blessed	with	a	telling	
margin	of	superiority	in	gun	power,	and	a	high	probability	of	victory	in	symmetrical	circumstances,	
Jellicoe	had	a	duty	to	be	wary	of	any	factor	that	might	move	the	balance	of	probability	in	favour	of	
his	opposite	number:	and	in	the	deployment	of	ever	more	powerful	modern	weaponry	in	the	
cramped	confines	of	the	North	Sea,	such	dangers	were	many.		In	this	light,	Jellicoe’s	famous	turn	
away	from	Scheer	after	crossing	the	‘T’	makes	greater	sense.	The	standard	view	of	Jellicoe’s	critics	is	
that	he	should	have	turned	towards	the	High	Seas	Fleet,	perhaps	losing	a	few	battleships	wounded	
by	torpedoes,	but	accepting	such	losses	in	pursuit	of	victory.		But	these	wounded	ships	could	easily	
have	crippled	the	Grand	Fleet’s	perfect	line	and	thereby	denied	him	the	conditions	essential	for	that	
victory.	
	
IV	
Despite	a	number	of	naval	actions	in	1914,	the	tactics	of	the	dreadnought	clash	were	first	put	the	
test	at	Dogger	Bank	in	January	1915,	when	British	and	German	battlecruisers	met.	This	skirmish	is	of	
significant	interest,	as	it	is	on	many	levels	a	small-scale	precursor	to	the	opening	‘Run	to	the	South’	
of	the	Jutland	Battle.	It	reveals	to	us	both	the	tactics	chosen	by	Beatty	and	Hipper	and	the	relative	
merits	of	the	ships.		
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	Uncertain	discussion	of	torpedo	tactics	pervades	the	literature	before	Jutland.	For	example,	within	one	
journal,	the	Proceedings	of	the	US	Naval	Institute,	one	has:	V.	Cuniberti	trans.	T.	Withers	Jr,	‘All	torpedoes!’,	
PUSNI,	40	(1914),	pp.	27-31,	advocating	a	fleet	of	small	semi-submersible	torpedo	boats;	Lt	R.	A.	Dawes,	‘Battle	
Tactics’,	PUSNI,	41	(1915),	pp.	1873-1895,	offering	a	turn	away	(but	not	towards)	as	a	fleet	tactic	when	under	
torpedo	attack;	and	H.	H.	Frost,	‘The	problem	of	firing	at	a	fleet	under	way	with	long-range	torpedoes’,	PUSNI,	
39	(1913),	pp.	681-698.	Perhaps	the	final	word	should	go	to	Lt	Chester	W.	Nimitz,	‘Military	value	and	tactics	of	
modern	submarines’,	PUSNI,	38	(1912),	pp.	1193-1211:	‘The	steady	development	of	the	torpedo	[and	the]	
submarine	…	will	result	in	a	most	dangerous	offensive	weapon,	…	which	will	have	a	large	part	in	deciding	fleet	
actions.’	
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				Dogger	Bank	is	usually	considered	to	be	an	opportunity	for	decisive	British	victory,
59
	lost	only	by	
an	untimely	signal	from	Ralph	Seymour	in	the	disabled	Lion.	The	contemporary	accounts	are	
strikingly	triumphal,	but	the	later	experience	of	Jutland	suggests	this	attitude	to	be	misplaced.	Had	
the	three	engaged	ships	–	Tiger,	Princess	Royal	and	New	Zealand	–	continued	against	the	three	
remaining	German	ships,	a	successful	result	was	unlikely	for	a	number	of	reasons.
60
		
				The	standard	of	gunnery	in	the	BCF	was	known	to	be	well	below	that	of	the	Grand	Fleet.	There	
were	no	facilities	for	gunnery	training	at	Rosyth	and	these	could	only	be	provided	when	BCF	
divisions	were	sent	in	rotation	to	the	Grand	Fleet	base	at	Scapa	Flow.	Nor	was	Beatty	inclined	to	
emphasize	accurate	gunnery.	His	view	was	that	rate	of	fire	was	more	important,	and	thus	safety	
features	that	might	have	reduced	this	were	disregarded,	creating	the	danger,	later	revealed	at	
Jutland,	of	a	turret	penetration	transmitting	explosive	fire	to	the	ships’	magazines	with	catastrophic	
results.
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		The	Germans,	by	contrast,	are	considered	to	have	learned	much	from	the	battle	in	this	
respect,	due	to	the	fortuitous	escape	of	Seydlitz	from	a	flash	explosion	not	unlike	Lion’s	near-miss	16	
months	later.	It	is	also	now	accepted	that	British	powder	was	much	more	combustible	than	German,	
placing	a	premium	on	stringent	measures	to	limit	the	transmission	of	flash	explosions.	
				Even	had	British	ammunition	handling	procedures	been	impeccable,	the	older	British	
battlecruisers	were	rendered	as	obsolescent	as	the	hapless	Blücher	in	their	scouting	role	by	the	
appearance	of	the	new	German	battlecruisers	with	heavier	armour	and	similar	armament.	Of	the	
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	Hughes,	Fleet	Tactics,	p75;	Capt	J.	Cresswell,	Royal	Naval	Staff	College	lecture	(1932),	Churchill	Archives	
Centre	CRES	3/2	
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	A	quantitative	study	by	the	authors	using	modern	Bayesian	methods	is	Niall	MacKay,	Christopher	Price	and	
A.	Jamie	Wood,	‘Weighing	the	Fog	of	War:	Illustrating	the	power	of	Bayesian	methods	for	historical	analysis	
through	the	Battle	of	the	Dogger	Bank’,	to	appear	in	Historical	Methods.	
61
	The	exchange	between	Jellicoe	and	Beatty	of	November	1915	makes	clear	the	difference	in	their	views:	
Jellicoe	writes	‘I	fear	the	rapidity	idea	was	carried	to	excess’,		Beatty	replies	‘I	feel	very	strongly	[that]	we	
should	endeavour	to	quicken	up	our	firing’,	and	Jellicoe	explains	that	‘I	am	all	for	rapiodity	of	fire,	but	my	only	
fear	is	that	ships	may	break	into	rapid	fire	too	soon’.	Jellicoe	Papers,	vol.1,	items	172-174.	
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three	ships	pursuing	the	German	battlecruisers,	the	armour	of	New	Zealand	could	not	have	
withstood	the	concentrated	fire	of	German	11”	and	12”	guns	at	medium	range.	Finally	all	
shortcomings	were	compounded	by	poor	fire	distribution,	which	left	Moltke	unmolested	when	Tiger	
mistakenly	concentrated	on	Seydlitz.	This	was	a	deadly	mistake	as	the	gunnery	of	even	German	
battlecruisers	deteriorated	sharply	when	under	fire,	in	contrast	to	their	excellent	performance	when	
not	engaged.	This	error	was	repeated	at	Jutland,	when	Derfflinger	was	not	taken	under	fire	and	
doubled	up	with	Seydlitz	on	Queen	Mary.		
				Tactically,	it	is	clear	from	this	battle	that	Beatty	had	failed	to	comprehend	key	ideas	from	pre-war	
tactics:	the	simultaneous	engagement	of	the	fleet,	positioning	of	flagship,	and	use	of	speed	and	
greater	gun	range	to	secure	unmolested	firing,	Fiske	and	Baudry’s	five	minutes.	The	first,	especially,	
would	come	back	to	haunt	the	BCF	in	the	early	stages	of	the	Jutland	encounter.						
				The	outcome	of	Dogger	Bank	might	seem	to	presage	a	catastrophe	for	the	Royal	Navy.	The	
chances	of	the	German	High	seas	Fleet	encountering	the	overconfident	BCF	in	isolation	and	exposing	
its	weaknesses	were	high	and	the	Germans	executed	just	such	a	plan	when	they	put	to	sea	on	May	
31	1916.	Previous	attempts	to	achieve	this	result	had	been	frustrated	by	circumstance	and	the	
timidity	of	Admirals	Pohl	and	Ingenohl,	who	were	reluctant	to	risk	the	High	Seas	Fleet	except	in	
overwhelmingly	favourable	conditions,	and	had	reason	to	fear	the	wrath	of	the	Kaiser	if	they	did.	
The	new	and	aggressive	commander	of	the	High	Seas	Fleet,	Scheer,	succeeded	in	his	primary	aim	of	
drawing	the	BCF	out	of	Rosyth,	but	the	initial	dispositions	suggested	a	German	rather	than	a	British	
disaster.	
				Jellicoe	was	aware	of	the	German	plan	through	interception	of	cracked	German	communications,	
and	put	to	sea	to	rendezvous	with	the	BCF	and	surprise	Scheer	with	the	concentrated	Grand	Fleet.	A	
chance	factor	also	unhinged	the	German	plan,	as	the	3
rd
	Battlecruiser	Squadron	[3BCS]	had	been	
detached	to	Scapa	Flow	for	gunnery	practice	and	temporarily	replaced	at	Rosyth	by	the	5
th
	Battle	
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Squadron,	[5BS]	consisting	of	four	of	the	five	new	Queen	Elizabeth	class	battleships,	easily	the	most	
powerful	warships	at	sea	on	the	day.	Apart	from	generic	faults	in	British	shells,	they	possessed	none	
of	the	shortcomings	of	the	battlecruisers	to	which	they	were	attached,	particularly	in	terms	of	
accurate	gunnery.	
				The	German	plan	was	to	meet	Beatty	with	the	High	Seas	Fleet’s	battlecruisers	under	Hipper	and	
draw	them	on	to	the	approaching	High	Seas	Fleet	for	destruction.	The	unsuspecting	Hipper,	
however,	with	five	battle	cruisers	seemed	destined	to	meet	ten	British	capital	ships.	In	such	
circumstances	the	Square	Law	promised	an	inevitable	result.	The	encounter	would	be	symmetrical,	
in	Lanchestrian	terms,	but	of	course	this	did	not	mean	an	even	contest.	British	ships	armed	with	15”	
and	13.5”	guns	could	engage	Hipper’s	11”	ships	beyond	effective	range	of	their	own	main	
armaments	and	he	would	have	no	prospect	of	concentrating	his	12”	fire	on	the	weaker	British	
vessels	before	his	fighting	power	was	eliminated.	Nor	would	he	have	time	to	retreat	on	to	the	HSF	
before	being	destroyed,	as	his	ships	were	slower	than	the	enemy	battlecruisers,	and	almost	matched	
by	5BS	
					However,	the	different	phases	of	the	battle	produced	aspects	of	the	extremes	desired	by	both	
sides.	The	weaknesses	in	Beatty’s	signalling	displayed	at	Dogger	Bank	were	repeated	and,	in	his	
eagerness	to	get	at	Hipper,	he	left	5BS	behind.	His	poor	deployment	of	5BS	far	to	his	rear	created	a	
third	subdivision	of	the	Grand	Fleet.	This	made	possible	Hipper’s	survival	and	presented	him	with	an	
opportunity.	Though	Hipper	was	unable	to	avoid	battle,	and	even	without	5BS	the	Square	Law	
suggested	a	negative	outcome	for	his	five	battecruisers	against	Beatty’s	six,	circumstances	favoured	
him.		Beatty’s	ships	closed	to	within	the	effective	range	of	German	guns	before	opening	fire,	and	
though	this	resulted	from	poor	visibility	rather	than	calculation,	the	effect	was	to	place	his	long-
armed	but	thin-skinned	force	of	battlecruisers	in	unnecessary	danger.	Poor	fire	distribution	left	
Derfflinger	unmolested	and	enabled	Hipper	to	achieve	moments	of	effective	numerical	superiority	in	
the	ragged	running	fight	which	developed	when	the	battlecruisers	met.		These	circumstances	
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suggested	the	elimination	of	Beatty’s	force,	in	the	first	place	because	the	Square	Law	would	not	
function	to	his	advantage,	and	then	after	the	immediate	loss	of	Indefatigable	(Fig.1,	point	A)	because	
it	would	start	to	work	against	him.	However,	unlike	Hipper,	the	speed	of	his	vessels	gave	him	the	
option	of	disengagement.	
				The	dynamics	of	this	process	are	clear	from	Figure	1,	with	Beatty	failing	to	achieve	concentration,	
and	thereby	a	favourable	gunfire	ratio,	during	the	first	twenty	minutes.	When	5BS	closed	the	range	
sufficiently	to	engage	(Fig.1,	B),	the	BCF	finally	achieved	concentration	and	Hipper	was	placed	in	
apparently	mortal	peril.	Beatty	was	able	to	open	the	range	between	his	battlecruisers	and	those	of	
the	enemy,	reducing	the	effectiveness	of	their	smaller	main	armament,	while	5BS	engaged	Hipper’s	
force	effectively	at	such	range	that	they	had	no	means	of	reply.	However,	5BS	at	this	stage	could	
only	engage	the	rear	of	Hipper’s	line	and,	unpleasant	though	this	was	for	Moltke	and	Von	der	Tann,	
Hipper’s	newest	and	most	powerful	vessels	Lützow	and	Derfflinger,	with	12”	guns	along	the	
centreline,	were	still	in	action	with	Beatty.		
				The	loss	of	Queen	Mary	to	an	explosion	occurred	at	this	point	of	the	battle	(Fig.1,	C).	The	
importance	of	Derfflinger's	escape	from	British	fire	at	the	outset	of	the	battle	has	been	dismissed	on	
the	grounds	of	the	German	ship's	poor	initial	shooting,
62
	but	she	had	still	not	been	hit	when	credited	
with	the	fatal	salvo	against	Queen	Mary,	firing	in	conjunction	with	Seydlitz,	and	had	not	suffered	the	
sharply	degrading	effects	of	battle	damage	on	her	fire	control.	Even	without	the	explosion,	the	
Square	Law	suggested	a	catastrophic	result	for	the	British	battlecruiser	in	this	unequal	exchange.	
With	5BS	in	action,	however,	the	undergunning	of	the	German	11”	ships	promised	to	be	the	decisive	
weakness	on	either	side	if	this	action	were	to	continue.	Von	der	Tann	particularly	began	to	suffer	
immediate	and	severe	damage.	In	fact,	the	arrival	of	Scheer	and	the	rest	of	the	High	Seas	Fleet	
(Fig.1,	D)	brought	the	‘Run	to	the	South’	phase	of	the	battle	to	a	close	and	turned	the	tables	again.		
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		Campbell,	Jutland,	p.	39.	
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				Beatty	was	now	decisively	outnumbered	and	his	only	option	was	to	reverse	course	and	seek	union	
with	the	Grand	Fleet.	This	was	also	his	duty	as	he	had	in	effect	succeeded	in	his	scouting	role	and	
located	the	enemy	fleet.		The	phase	of	the	battle	known	as	the	‘Run	to	the	North’	thus	began,	
though	not	quite	yet	for	the	Queen	Elizabeths	of	5BS,	which	still	on	a	southward	course	passed	
Beatty’s	ships	heading	north,	waiting	anxiously	for	the	order	to	execute	a	delayed	signal	to	turn	
(Fig.1,	E).		When	this	arrived	each	ship	of	5BS	turned	in	sequence	and	faced	the	concentrated	fire	
alone	while	turning,	creating	a	situation	which	these	uniquely	valuable	vessels	should	never	have	
faced	and	in	which	the	Germans	might	again	have	achieved	their	desired	risk-fleet	result.	Once	again	
Beatty’s	failure	to	understand	the	Lanchestrian	dynamic	is	starkly	visible	in	Figure	1,	where	between	
points	D	and	F	we	observe	a	reversal	of	the	gunfire	ratio	in	the	Germans’	favour,	the	only	period	of	
the	battle	during	which	this	was	achieved.	Catastrophe	was	avoided,	however,	and	5BS	was	able	to	
stay	ahead	of	the	pursuing	enemy,	absorb	a	number	of	hits	and	damage	enemy	vessels	with	
effective	gunnery,	before	action	was	broken	off	(Fig.1,	F).		
					In	both	phases	of	the	scouting	duel,	the	Germans	enjoyed	a	visibility	advantage,	with	the	British	
ships	outlined	against	the	setting	sun	while	their	own	were	concealed	in	the	murk	to	the	East.	
However,	in	the	Run	to	the	North,	the	duel	between	Hipper	and	Beatty	continued	and	in	stark	
contrast	to	the	Run	to	the	South	Beatty	had	the	better	of	it.	Beatty	was	now	much	more	careful	to	
use	his	superior	speed,	increasingly	apparent	as	the	Germans’	inferior	brown	coal	took	its	toll,	to	
dictate	the	range	of	engagement	for	his	battlecruisers,	while	Valiant	and	Barham	of	5BS	scored	
repeatedly	against	Hipper’s	ships.		Though	the	results	of	this	continuing	engagement	were	
undramatic,	they	suggest	the	likely	outcome	had	Beatty	deployed	wisely	in	the	run	to	the	south	with	
his	full	force.	Beatty,	however,	now	achieved	success	by	delivering	the	unsuspecting	High	Seas	Fleet	
onto	Jellicoe’s	guns,	again	reversing	the	advantage.	
				When	the	battle	fleets	met	(Fig.1,	G),	Jellicoe	having	successfully	deployed	in	battle	line	to	port,	an	
ideal	Lanchestrian	positional	situation	was	created	in	which	the	High	Seas	Fleet	would	normally	be	
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destroyed	(Fig.1,	H,	at	1830).	Again	poor	visibility	favoured	the	Germans	enough	to	save	them,	for	
although	the	orientation	of	the	fleets	relative	to	the	setting	sun	was	reversed	in	favour	of	the	British,	
general	visibility	by	this	time	was	patchy	and	in	places	reduced	almost	to	zero,	negating	Jellicoe’s	
numerical	advantage	and	momentarily	reversing	it	when	Invincible,	ranging	with	3BCS	ahead	of	
Jellicoe	was	suddenly	exposed	by	a	change	in	the	light.	This	misfortune	led,	as	with	Queen	Mary,	to	
adverse	Square	Law	concentration	in	which	she	was	exposed	(a	few	minutes	after	Fig.1,	G)	to	the	fire	
of	two	German	ships,	Lützow	firing	the	salvo	resulting	in	Invincible’s	fatal	explosion	(at	point	H	in	
Fig.1).	Nevertheless,	the	accuracy	of	the	shooting	of	3BCS	was	clearly	improved	by	their	training	at	
Scapa	Flow,	and	Invincible	is	credited	with	inflicting	fatal	damage	on	Lützow	before	her	demise.	Thus	
the	oldest	battlecruiser	and	the	newest	present	at	the	battle	effectively	sank	each	other.	
				Confronted	with	the	concentrated	Grand	Fleet,	Scheer	had	no	option	but	flight.	He	successfully	
executed	the	battle	turn	away	practised	for	such	an	occasion	(Fig.1,	I),	aided	by	poor	visibility	which	
prevented	at	least	half	of	the	Grand	Fleet’s	battleships	from	engaging,
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		and	vanished	into	the	murk	
before	turning	and	blundering	into	Jellicoe	again	(Fig.1,	J,	at	1900).	The	turn	away	then	had	to	be	
repeated,	but	was	‘a	shambles’	compared	to	the	first	attempt:	on	this	second	occasion,	visibility	was	
better	for	the	British,	many	more	of	Jellicoe’s	ships	found	targets,	and	the	manoeuvre	was	poorly	
executed	under	heavy	fire	(Fig.1,	K,	not	sharply	defined).	At	this	point,	the	Square	Law	‘was	
beginning	to	tip	the	High	Seas	Fleet	down	a	steepening	slope	to	oblivion’,
64
	but	the	disarray	of	
Scheer’s	ships	was	ultimately	masked	by	the	laying	of	smoke,	a	well-executed	destroyer	attack	on	
the	Grand	Fleet	forcing	a	turn	away,	and	a	sacrificial	charge	by	his	battlecruisers.	In	this	‘death	
charge’	on	the	British	fleet,	further	poor	visibility	saved	Hipper’s	ships	from	extended	punishment	
and	enabled	them	to	escape,	but	in	a	rare	clash	of	the	newest	vessels	Derfflinger		was		‘shattered’,	
primarily	by	the	new	15”	battleship	Revenge,	losing	two	of	her	four	turrets	in	a	matter	of	
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33	
	
moments.
65
	In	better	conditions,	neither	of	Scheer’s	about	turns	would	have	saved	him	if	conducted	
in	full	view	of	the	concentrated	Grand	Fleet.	Nevertheless,	the	point	of	decision	had	been	reached	
and	Jellicoe	had,	in	strategic	terms,	won.
66
	No	bright	prospect	other	than	escape	remained	to	
Scheer,	and	he	later	crept	past	Jellicoe	in	the	dark.	
	
	
V	
The	British	capital	ships	lost	at	Jutland	were	all	battlecruisers.	Two	of	the	three	lost	were	among	
Britain’s	oldest	vessels	of	this	type,	less	well	protected	and	armed	than	later	ships:	the	real	shock	
was	the	loss	of	the	new	Queen	Mary,	which	can	nevertheless	be	matched	against	the	equally	
valuable	Lützow	despite	much	heavier	loss	of	life	on	the	British	ship.	There	is	little	evidence	to	point	
to	systemic	weakness	in	British	ship	design	and	doctrine	in	the	context	of	dreadnought	encounters.	
Shortcomings	relate	more	to	the	habits	of	the	BCF	and	Beatty’s	idiosyncratic	leadership,	all	of	which	
had	been	on	display	at	Dogger	Bank.	
				Apart	from	this,	sources	agree	that	British	cordite	was	much	more	likely	to	explode	than	German,	
and	that	if	both	fleets	had	been	equipped	with	the	British	propellant	at	least	one	German	capital	
ship	would	have	met	the	same	fate.	However,	catastrophic	explosion	required	a	fire	or	cordite	
detonation	reaching	a	main	magazine,	and	the	evidence	of	the	battle	was	that	such	a	fate	was	by	no	
means	overwhelmingly	probable	in	British	ships.	All	the	British	losses	involved	a	shell	penetrating	a	
gun	turret,	causing	a	cordite	fire	which	transmitted	itself	to	a	main	magazine	and	triggered	a	
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	Gordon,	Rules	of	the	Game,	p.	459.	
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	Jellicoe	had	at	least	twice	previously	stated	his	attention	not	to	be	drawn	into	a	fleet	engagement	deep	in	
the	German	Bight	late	in	the	day.	Letter	from	Jellicoe	to	Capt	Frederic	Dreyer,	9
th
	July	1915,	Churchill	Archives	
Centre,	DRYR	3/1;	memorandum	from	Jellicoe	to	Adm	Sir	Henry	Jackson,	12
th
	April	1916,	Jellicoe	Papers,	vol.1	
item	213.	
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catastrophic	explosion.	Only	a	fraction	of	German	hits	could	be	expected	to	hit	a	turret,	and	a	
smaller	fraction	to	penetrate.	Lion	was	hit	13	times	by	the	12”	shells	of	Lützow	in	addition	to	the	
near-fatal	turret	hit,	and	Tiger	was	hit	13	times	without	seeming	likely	to	sink.	Among	turret	hits,	not	
all	would	cause	catastrophe,	which	was	preventable	by	alert	fire	control	and	flooding	of	magazines	
as	on	Lion.	Queen	Mary	exploded	some	time	after	being	hit,	implying,	for	whatever	reason,	
unsuccessful	fire	fighting	and	damage	control.		
				If	the	probability	of	a	catastrophic	hit	from	a	single	shell	was	very	low,	German	chances	of	
inflicting	such	a	blow	would	obviously	be	increased	if	more	guns	could	be	brought	to	bear	on	the	
target.	When	outnumbered,	German	guns	were	less	likely	to	score	a	turret	hit	than	British,	but	the	
different	phases	of	the	fighting	at	Jutland	provided	occasions	when	this	was	not	so.	Queen	Mary	and	
Indefatigable	were	lost	when	the	former	was	fired	on	exclusively	by	more	than	one	German	ship	for	
a	period	of	time	and	the	latter	when	she	became	detached	from	the	line.	Similarly,	Invincible,	though	
in	the	van	of	the	Grand	Fleet,	was	two	miles	ahead	of	it	when	fatally	hit	facing	odds	of	2-1	in	chance	
conditions	of	suddenly	improved	visibility	for	the	Germans.	
				It	is	usually	assumed	that	the	battlecruisers’	adopted	role	as	a	fast	wing	of	the	Grand	Fleet	was	a	
mistake	which	placed	them	in	mortal	danger.	However,	if	they	had	met	the	Germans	as	part	of	the	
Grand	Fleet	in	line	of	battle	their	chances	of	survival	would	have	been	greater	than	when	skirmishing	
with	German	battlecruisers.	A	heavily	outnumbered	German	fleet	could	not	have	expected	to	
concentrate	the	weight	of	fire	on	any	one	battlecruiser	that	they	actually	achieved	at	Jutland,	and	at	
the	outset	of	action	a	number	of	British	ships	would	have	received	no	fire	at	all,	most	likely	those	
which	overlapped	the	German	line	at	either	end,	where	the	battlecruisers	expected	to	be	stationed.		
				A	further	factor	working	against	the	Germans	was	that	their	prospects	of	achieving	catastrophic	
hits,	although	slim,	were	greatest	at	the	outset	of	battle.	Jellicoe	was	consistent	in	his	view	that	the	
first	five	minutes	of	fire	were	likely	to	be	decisive,	no	doubt	influenced	by	his	reading	of	pre-war	
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material.
67
	Though	German	ships	could	remain	afloat	after	sustaining	enormous	damage	their	utility	
in	a	fleet	encounter	would	cease	when	the	last	of	their	main	armament	was	silenced.	This	would	
occur	at	an	increasing	rate	as	the	battle	progressed	with	a	concomitant	reduction	in	their	capacity	to	
inflict	equivalent	damage	on	the	British.	The	rate	and	effectiveness	of	the	fire	of	German	
battlecruisers	also	degraded	rapidly	as	the	vessels	received	hits,	whether	or	not	they	penetrated	the	
armour:	the	kinetic	energy	imparted	by	the	impact	of	the	large	British	shells	was	considerable,	
producing	a	shock	effect	on	the	crew	and	degrading	the	effectiveness	of	sensitive	fire	control	
equipment.
68
	In	this	context,	the	failure	of	the	BCF	to	engage	the	new	and	dangerous	Derfflinger	
early	in	the	battle	was	a	grave	error.	Generally	inaccurate	shooting	by	the	BCF	also	handed	Hipper	
the	early	initiative,	stressing	again	the	value	of	the	‘first	five	minutes’.	
				Thus	none	of	the	apparent	weaknesses	of	British	ships	relative	to	German	was	likely	to	affect	
decisively	a	broadside-to-broadside	encounter	of	the	battle	fleets.	The	strengths	resulting	from	
earlier	decisions,	chiefly	in	terms	of	numerical	superiority	in	ships,	guns	and	gun	calibre,	were	much	
more	important.	In	Lanchestrian	terms,	German	success	would	have	to	be	achieved	through	their	
longed-for	Kraftausgleich.		They	put	to	sea	on	31
st
	May	1916	with	precisely	this	intention,	and	during	
that	day	and	the	following	night	the	Lanchestrian	balance	shifted	fluidly	between	the	opposing	sides,	
more	than	once	changing	radically	within	seconds	as	each	sought	to	achieve	a	Clausewitzian	point	of	
decision	[Schwerpunkt].	
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	Fiske,	American	Naval	Policy;	Baudry,	The	Naval	Battle.	
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	The	capacity	of	bursting	British	shell	to	degrade	German	fighting	capacity	is	well	documented	in	Yates,	The	
Jutland	Controversy.	
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VI	
From	a	Lanchestrian	perspective	both	sides	flirted	with	disaster	at	various	stages	of	the	Battle	of	
Jutland.	However,	the	Germans	achieved	a	three	to	one	advantage	in	dreadnoughts	sunk,	and	more	
importantly	escaped	extermination.	This	result	seemed	to	defy	Lanchestrian	probability	as	it	was	
understood	at	the	time.	Each	of	Scheer’s	massive	blunders	was	an	unforced	error	which	would	have	
cost	him	his	fleet	had	not	random	factors	involving	weather	and	circumstantial	British	deployments	
developed	exactly	as	they	did	on	the	day.			
				When	the	fleets	set	sail,	the	forewarned	British	in	advance	of	Scheer,	the	most	probable	outcome	
was	the	destruction	of	Hipper’s	battlecruisers	by	the	reinforced	BCF,	possibly	for	the	loss	of	one	or	
two	British	battlecruisers,	but	with	the	firepower	of	5BS	ensuring	British	predominance.	After	this,	
Scheer	would	necessarily	have	returned	to	port	with	all	hope	of	a	future	challenge	to	the	Grand	
Fleet	abandoned.	Beatty’s	weaknesses,	and	those	he	tolerated	in	his	subordinates,	threw	away	this	
favourable	situation	and	for	a	time	offered	the	Germans	exactly	the	limited	yet	portentous	victory	
they	sought.	However,	Beatty’s	unstable	dynamic	produced	a	still	less	probable	event:	a	clash	of	the	
fleets	in	which	Scheer	could	not	prevail.	Taken	as	a	whole,	however,	the	battle	produced	at	the	
strategic	level	exactly	the	outcome	that	Lanchester’s	logic	would	predict.	The	full	Lanchestrian	
battle,	with	its	certain	defeat,	must	always	be	declined	by	the	numerically-inferior	force.
69
		
				The	25	British	dreadnought	battleships	of	less	than	15"	main	armament	were	not	everything	that	
could	be	desired	but,	in	mounting	127	turrets	of	twin	guns	of	at	least	12”	calibre,	they	nevertheless	
provided	a	fleet-in-being	large	enough,	by	a	narrow	margin,	to	deter	any	German	thought	of	
engaging	in	a	full	fleet	action	without	previous	attempts	at	partial	attrition.	This	was	in	itself	a	
decisive	strategic	result,	but	must	be	considered	a	bluff	if	British	ships	were	markedly	inferior	to	
their	German	equivalents.	Evidence	suggests	that	this	was	not	the	case.	British	build	quality	per	unit	
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	Hughes,	‘Naval	tactics	and	their	influence	on	strategy’,	as	noted	above.	
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which	was	deliberately	less	than	optimal,	especially	in	speed	and	armour,	was	offset	by	incremental	
improvement,	superior	numbers	and	gunpower:		the	culminating	vessels	in	the	British	production	
process,	the	Queen	Elizabeths,	were	outstanding	vessels	by	any	standard.	
				Judgements	of	the	technical	qualities	of	opposing	ships	should	also	recognise	that	the	British	and	
German	fleets	were	engaged	in	a	process	of	technological	leapfrog	during	a	period	of	extraordinarily	
swift	development,	and	on	occasions	such	as	Jutland	vessels	produced	in	the	early	part	of	the	period	
could	find	themselves	outclassed	when	encountering	newer	vessels.		At	Jutland	the	British	fielded	six	
battleships	in	the	ultimate	dreadnought	configuration	of	fore	and	aft	turrets	along	the	centreline,	to	
two	German	battlecruisers	of	the	same	type,	one	of	which	was	lost.		As	might	be	expected,	Lützow	
and	Derfflinger	were	deadly	opponents	to	other	battlecruisers	and	older	dreadnought	battleships,	
but	when	Derfflinger	encountered	Revenge,	the	battleship	overpowered	the	battlecruiser	in	a	match	
of	generationally-compatible	vessels	in	which	Derfflinger’s	limited	main	armament	was	not	
effectively	offset	by	enhanced	armour.	In	sum,	the	Germans	were	outnumbered	and	at	least	
matched	in	technological	terms	by	the	Grand	Fleet,	and	this	being	the	case	tactics	became	of	
paramount	importance.		
				Thus	the	adverse	balance	of	British	losses	indicated	not	overall	weakness	but	rather	that	Jutland	
was	the	great	Lanchestrian	battle	that	never	quite	happened,	as	Scheer	was	twice	able	to	decline	its	
culmination	when	he	knew	himself	to	be	moments	from	destruction.		Nevertheless,	at	the	
operational	and	tactical	levels	the	battle	still	respected	a	Lanchestrian	dynamic,	as	the	shifting	fight	
between	squadrons	and	ships	produced	moments	of	battle	when	concentration	was	realized	and	the	
resulting	advantages	accrued,	broadly	favouring	the	Germans.	The	costly	British	victory	at	Jutland	is,	
therefore,	best	understood	in	Lanchestrian	terms	as	a	race	for	concentration	which	Jellicoe	
ultimately	won.	Although	this	was	not	converted	into	German	ships	sunk,	and	critics	on	both	sides	
were	quick	to	contrast	Jutland	with	Trafalgar,	the	effect	on	the	enemy’s	will	to	fight	was	much	the	
same	and	Jellicoe’s	actions	and	his	understanding	of	his	situation	must	be	considered	sound.		
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				Jutland	should	therefore	be	seen	as	a	victory	shaped	from	1905	to	1916	by	a	developing	but	
integrated	vision	of	fleet	policy	and	tactics	which	enabled	Fisher’s	programme	of	perpetual	
technological	advance	to	be	carried	through	to	strategic	success.	Essential	to	this	was	numerical	
superiority,	dictated	by	the	crux	of	Lanchester’s	argument,	the	quantification	of	the	trade-off	
between	numbers	and	quality.
70
	The	Royal	Navy,	for	all	its	flaws,	was	a	learning	organization,	in	
which	reforming	drive	was	balanced	by	technocratic	experts	making	finely-balanced	decisions	in	a	
rational	manner	through	a	period	of	intense	technological	and	tactical	change.	It	got	the	big	
decisions	right,	building	and	correctly	wielding	its	decisive	weapon,	the	Grand	Fleet,	to	achieve	the	
required	strategic	victory.	
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